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IMMATURITY AND THE JURIDICAL ABILITY TO 
CONTRACT MARRIAGE IN TERMS OF CANON 1095 
OF THE CODE OF CANON LAW 
REV. JOSEPH BAJADA 
By far the most common grounds that are brought forward in Ecclesiastical 
Tribunals nowadays to prove the nullity of a marriage are those of lack of due 
discretion and inability to assume and fulfil marital obligations 1• Often 
enough, the motive to sustain such a claim is that either or both parties were 
not sufficiently mature to contract marriage at the time of their wedding. 
But what exactly are the canonical implications of this? What amount of 
maturity does canonical jurisprudence require of a person to be considered 
capable of contracting a valid marriage? 
The following is a reproduction of The Law Section in a recent Decision 
of the First Instance Ecclesiastical Tribunal, before Fr. Joseph Bajada, Judge 
and Relator. The Nullity of the marriage in case was alleged on the grounds 
of lack of sufficient discretion of judgement and / or inability to assume marital 
obligations because of immaturity in one of the parties. 
THE LAW 
3. In line with c. 1055 t 1, marriage can be described as a "covenant,
by which a man and a woman establish between themselves a partnership of 
their whole life, and which of its very nature is ordered to the well-being of 
the spouses and to the procreation and upbringing of children''. This covenant 
and partnership has been raised "to the dignity of a sacrament" between the 
baptised 2 and has as its essential properties unity and indissolubility 3 . In 
other words, marriage can be described as a partnership between a man and 
a woman which is exclusive, indissoluble, and sacramental. The goals of this 
partnership are the well-being of the parties and the procreation and upbringing 
of children. 
4. According to c. 105 7 t 1, "a marriage is brought into being by the
lawfully manifested consent of persons who are legally capable. This consent 
cannot be supplied by any human power''. Consent then is the efficient cause 
of marriage; it is consent which brings a marriage into being; if that consent 
is lacking or if it is in some way gravely defective, then there is something 
radically defective about the marriage contracted. The Code supplies a definition 
of consent in c. 1057 t 2: "Matrimonial consent is an act of will by which 
a man and a woman by an irrevocable covenant mutually give and accept one 
another for the purpose of establishing a marriage''. 
5. While this definition, which has its roots firmly fixed in scholastic
philosophy and theology, distinguishes between the various functions of the 
human psyche, e.g. intellect and will, it must be stressed that in reality the 
human psyche cannot be divided up into little pieces. On the contrary is acts 
as a unit. Thus canonists have stressed that consent is not simply and solely 
an act of the will. Says L. ORSY: "everything in a human psyche contributes 
to it in varying degrees" -l • 
Indeed, it was St. THOMAS himself who taught that man "differs from 
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non-intelligent creatures in this, that he is the master of what he does ... Now 
he is master through his mind and will, which is why his free decision is referred 
to as an ability of reason and will. Therefore those acts alone are properly called 
human which are of his own deliberate willing'' 5 .
Jurisprudence, in turn, has stressed that· such distinctions between 
intellect and will are not actual divisions: ''Actus itaque liber minime habendus 
est ut constans duobus actibus independentibus ac perfectis, intellectus scilicet 
et voluntatis ... Prior est unitas. Haec unitas in agendo fundatur in unitate 
subiecti, in quo utraque facultas radicatur et exprimit mutuam obiectorum 
formalium implicationem atque identitatem realem. Quidquid ergo, funditus 
vel graviter laedit hanc mutuam obiectorum formalium implicationem atque 
identitatem realem, quidquid funditus vel graviter laedit hanc mutuam 
causalitatem intellectus et voluntatis in deliberatione de tali matrimonio con­
trahendo et in volitione elicienda, consensum matrimonialem irritat" 6. For 
this reason when investigating the alleged nullity of marriage because of a defect 
of consent, one cannot simply focus on problems associated with the will. On 
the contrary, all the aspects of the person's personality and experience must 
be examined, as far as possible and this to consider how any ,aspect of it may 
have adversely affected the act of consent. 
6. According to c. 1095, "the following are incapable of contracting
marriage: 1. those who lack sufficient use of reason; 2. those who suffer from 
a grave lack of discretion of judgement concerning the essential matrimonial 
rights and obligations to be mutually given and accepted; 3. those who, because 
of causes of a psychological nature, are unable to assume the essential obligations 
of marriage." 
The second and third of the grounds in the canon, are the ones which 
are relevant to this particular case, namely lack of discretion of judgement and 
inability to assume the marital obligations. 
A. LACK OF REQUIRED DISCRETION OF JUDGEMENT
7. "In brief, 'discretion' means 'maturity' and 'judgement' means
'decision'. In other words, 'discretion of judgement' means a 'mature decision' 
which presupposes the presence of adequate knowledge about all the essential 
elements which constitute marriage including the very persons of the 
contractants, and internal freedom to deliberate and choose marriage without 
any interference. Rotal Jurisprudence has isolated some of the elements of this 
'decision', that is marriage consent. 
The first element is ''adequate knowledge'' of the subjects and of the object 
of matrimonial consent. This knowledge should be not merely speculative or 
abstract, but appreciative (evaluative) as well. 
The second element is the ability for critical reflection which consists in 
putting judgements together in order to arrive at a new judgement or decision. 
The third element is internal freedom not only for critical reflection but 
also for making the final decision (election) concerning the object'' 7 .
We read in a decision b.efore SABA TT ANI: '' U nica mensura sufficientis 
consensus est discretio iudicii matrimonio proportionata. Quando deficit 
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huiusmodi maturitas iudicii sufficiens ad matrimonium intelligendum vel
eliciendum, sive id proveniat ex habituali alienatione animi, sive ex exturbatione
transeunti, sive ex psichica debilitate, habetur amentia in sensu contractuali ...
nee sufficit facultas cognoscitiva, quae sistit in apprehensione simplici veri, sed
requiritur facultas critica, quae est vis iudicahdi et ratiocinandi, et iudicia una
componendi ut novum iudicium inde logice deducatur (cfr. SRR c. Felici, diei 
3*12*57; c. Lamas, diei 21 *10*59). Matrimonium tune tantum valet, quando 
per hanc criticam facultatem homo potuit deliberationes efformare et libere 
voluntatis excitare actus'' 8 .
8. According to the Code of Canon Law, a grave lack of discretion of
judgement concerning the essential matrimonial rights and obligations renders 
a person incapable of marriage and thereby renders any marriage contracted 
by such a person invalid. 
This faculty is something which is possessed by the majority of human 
beings. It is not unreasonable to presume that this discretion of judgement, 
this critical, evaluative faculty is present in all persons who have attained a 
certain age. The basic reason behind this conclusion is that marriage is a natural 
state and all humans are presumed capable of contracting marriage u'nless the 
contrary has been proved. 
'' Sed lege ecclesiali haud requiritur immodicus quidem capacitatis 
psychicae gradus, quia ad valide contrahendum sufficit ut vir decimum sextum 
aetatis annum expleat, mulier vero decimum quartum item completum habeat 
( c. 1083 t 1). Tune enim praesumitur in contrahentibus sufficiens gradus 
discretionis iudicii circa iura et officia matrimonialia essentialia mutuo tradenda 
et acceptanda . . . Qui igitur legitimam aetatem ad matrimonium attingit, 
sufficientem discretionem ad sese obligandum habere censetur ita ut in 
matrimonium valide consentire possit (c. 1058)" 9 •
"Nullibi requiritur altissimum intelligentiae acumen, plenave psychologica 
aut affectiva maturitas nee perfecta obligationum coniugalium communionisve 
vitae intellectio" 10.
In other words, the law presumes that sufficient maturity of judgement 
to validly contract marriage is present in a fourteen year old girl. This means 
that a fourteen year old, who is as mature as a fourteen year old in her culture 
would be expected to be; and in that respect at least, has the capacity for 
marriage. 
9. It must be concluded therefore that, although it does occur, a lack of
discretion of judgement proportionate to marriage is something exceptional. 
It does happen occasionally that a person is not able to weigh up all that he 
or she knows about marriage, about his or her situation, about his or her partner 
in such a way that a valid consent to marriage is given. But allegations to the 
effect that "he wasn't mature enough for marriage" ... "she was too young" 
... "only a child" ... "didn't know what he was doing" ... "hadn't a notion" 
... "knew nothing", etc., are not enough to declare a marriage null. To declare 
a person as "immature" does not in itself permit one to draw any immediate 
conclusion as to the person's ability to consent to marriage. Just as in the case 
of other psychological disturbances, including those in which a diagnostic tag 
can be applied with certainty, each case must be judged on its own merits, 
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on the basis of the evidence presented in the Acts, and, on the evidence of the 
expert witnesses 11• Phrases like those mentioned further up in this paragraph 
can easily be expressions of sympathy with the person whose marriage has failed, 
or in retrospect from the vantage of experience. However, the lay witness may 
not mean what a judicial mind might take it to mean. What is required is to 
identify a cause, some reason why he or she was not able to do what most other 
persons in that situation are able to do. 
10. Precisely because of this, in cases of alleged nullity for reasons of
immaturity, special attention is called for since this term "is an umbrella-term 
which covers many conditions, involving various degrees of seriousness, 
duration, and incapacitating consequences'' 12. It is clear therefore that such 
a term can mean almost anything. Yet it does have value in marriage nullity 
cases -- as the frequent references to it in ecclesiastical Jurisprudence clearly 
shows. 
W .J. DEVLIN has described psychological or emotional immaturity as 
'' meeting adult situations with infantile patterns of behaviour'' 13.
"Immaturity can be seen, therefore, as a defect of personality or character 
development, the seriousness of which can vary according to the degree to which 
the balance between the various aspects of the person's psychic make-up is 
disturbed' ' 14•
11. In the just-quoted work, McAREA VEY indicated four sources of
emotional immaturity 15
a. immaturity connected with adolescence, which is also referred to as
"prematurity" or "immaturite de passage" 16• It is distinguished
from an immaturity which is deeply rooted in the structure of the
personality and is generally overcome with experience of life. This
immaturity is of a transient nature and can be considered as a lack
of experience of life rather than a radical personality or character
defect. Youthful immaturity is not per se a bar to marriage.
b. immaturity found in adults. In these persons, immature character
traits have endured into adulthood so that although they have reached
chronological adulthood, they have not reached a corresponding
degree of psychological maturity. Such persons are described as being
'' arrested in growth of character, intellect and emotions, ...
characterised by weakness of will, vacillating opinion and convictions,
infantile attitudes and viewpoints, and a lack of emotional
control'' 17.
c. immaturity as a sympton of personality disorder: in this case persons
who suffer from a specific personality disorder manifest immature
behaviour as a characteristic symptom. In this category,
N. CAMERON also speaks of the inadequate personality 18•
The term '' inadequate personality'' 
includes those personalities whose response to the ordinary demands 
of life -- intellectual, emotional, social and physical -- are generally 
ineffectual. Such persons are "inept in life, show poor judgement 
continually, are usually improvident and lacking in a normal sense 
of responsibility'' 19• In spite of normal or above average intelligence, 
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the inadequate personality pursues immediate pleasure like a child, 
unable to postpone it in the interest of the reality principle. Cameron 
notes that for some reasons this personality is ''unable to carry through 
a normal maturing process that would lead to a responsible 
adulthood" 20.
d. immaturity which emerges in the context of mental retardation 21.
The characteristic traits of this emotional immaturity are: an
exaggerated fixation on parental images, the need of protection, lack
of independence, the focusing of the person's interest on himself or
on his own activities, and an egoism which is expressed in touchiness,
vanity and stubborness 22•
12. In marriage nullity cases it is not sufficient to aliege or even to prove
that someone was "immature"" or "showed immature traits" in his or her 
behaviour, no matter what the source of the immaturity. One needs to examine 
the known facts about the person's behaviour before and during marriage and 
see how these reflect the person's alleged immaturity. In addition, careful 
consideration should be given to other important decisions made by the person 
around the time of marriage, to see what effect, if any, his immaturity had. 
But what must always be kept in mind is the necessity to show the influence 
of alleged immaturity on the decision to marry, to show from the evidence how 
this condition adversely affected the person's judgement and rendered him or 
her incapable of contracting marriage. 
"There is a risk too of confusing the canonical category of "maturity" 
with the psychological category of ''maturity". In psychology, maturity is 
understood to be the "end-point" of human development: ... In Canon Law, 
however, "maturity" is the minimal "starting-point" necessary and sufficient 
for a person both to intend and to implement the object of matrimonial consent, 
even when difficulties and obstacles creat conditions of distress because of bad 
will, or even if there are unconscious conflicts in the parties" 23. What the
Judge must look for in cases of nullity for alleged immaturity "is that minimum 
"discretion of judgement" and "use of reason" which prepares someone to 
enter marriage and then continues to grow and develop. When we use the term 
"immaturity", we can confuse it if we are looking for the situation in which 
a person experiences an almost eschatological integration of himself or herself, 
at which point everything is simply in order" 24. "Matrimonium non est 
maturitatis acquisitae culmen, sed phasis evolutiva in processu manona 
maturitatis acquirendae" 25. 
B. INABILITY TO ASSUME MARITAL OBLIGATIONS
13. In a case where a lack of due discretion is claimed on the basis of a
deep-rooted psychological disorder, the question of a person's ability / inability 
to assume the essential obligations of marriage may also arise, regardless of 
whether or not a lack of due discretion is proved. 
The distinction between these two grounds is clear in principle, even if 
it is not easy in application. The ground of lack of due discretion refers to an 
ability to posit a true act of consent. Where the powers of reason and will are 
so disordered or undeveloped at the time of the wedding that the object of 
consent cannot be sufficiently understood in its practical and relational 
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implications, then no true consent can be given. On the other haD.d the ground 
of inability to assume relates not to the act of cons nt but to its obJect. One 
cannot validly consent to deliver an object n t within one s power: ''the 
obligation has no value if someone obliges him elf to give or do sornetfong of 
which he is incapable''. ''Psichica incapacitate adsumendi onera matnmonialia 
essentialia laborat qui, ob gravem anomaliam psychicam, haud se obligare ad 
constituendam vitae consortium perpetuum et exclusivum, ex sua natura 
ordinatum ad coniugum bonum et ad prolem generandam atque 
aducandam'' 26•
14. The object we are speaking about here is not every aspect of marriage
needed to make it happy, but those elements which are constitutive of marriage, 
understood as a whole life partnership ordered to the well-being of the spouses 
and the procreation and upbringing of children. It involves the essential 
properties of unity and indissolubility and, for the baptised, sacramentality. 
Where causes of a psychological nature render impossible one or more of these 
elements, or the "consoritum vitae", then the marriage would be null. 
Given the nature of the case under examination, the T·ribunal deems it 
important to make a number of observations. 
15. In the first place it must be noted that the conjugal relationship we
have referred to above "non est ita cum exito suo confundenda ut coniuges 
qui nequeunt certum quemdam gradum felicitatis connubialis vel 'perfectionis' 
propriae vel 'satisfactionis' mutuae assequi, statim exsistimentur oporteat 
inhabiles ad ipsam relationem valide constituendam'' 27•
16. In cases which come under this heading of nullity, what is in question
is a disorder which is of its nature destructive of a marriage relationship. It · 
is not alone the non-existence of a marriage relationship which is relevant. It 
is only if this non-existence is due to genuine inc;apacity arising from a 
personality disorder that a plea of nullity can be entertained on this particular 
ground. Therefore in the method of proof, it is necessary to demonstrate a direct 
relationship between the absence of any of the obligations of marriage, including 
the community of life and the personality structure of one of the parties. One 
must be cautious lest, as Mgr. DI FELICE pointed out, incapacity be confused 
with an unwillingness to fulfil the duties assumed in matrimonial consent 28•
Of course, not all personality disorders are incapacitating. While psychic defects 
can render the creation of a marital relationship difficult, it is only the very 
serious and relatively rare disorders which render a marriage impossible. A 
valid marriage cannot be beyond the attainment of the "average person", who 
is equipped with both good and bad personality characteristics. For this reason 
one must distinguish between what is desirable for marriage and what is 
essential. The pastors and counsellors of the Church have a duty of promoting 
the desirable and even the ideal. Judges in nullity cases are confined to a 
consideration of the minimum required for validity. This minimum does not 
depend on the subjective expectations of any individual. 
With regards to the case under examination, it is never too much to stress 
how dangerous it is to use the term immaturity in a vague, general sense as 
constituting an incapacity to sustain an interpersonal relationship 29. As 
another decision before PINTO pointed out, although it is only in the final 
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stage of adolescence (between the age of sixteen and nineteen) that the capacity 
for true oblative love developes in men, such degree of maturity is not necessary 
. to be present for valid consent 30. And he adds: "With regard to immaturity 
and the lack of equilibrium, it must be remembered that not just every defect 
is sufficient to warrant a declaration of nullity. Rather a defect must be so serious 
as to render the person either incapable of free consent or incapable of assuming 
the essential_responsibilities of marriage, i.e. with regard to children, fidelity 
and indissolubility'' 31. 
17. In assessing the degree of severity of the psychic disorder in case, the
Court considers the long-term pattern of a person's pehaviour, taking into 
account whether or not it was significantly deviant from what might be 
considered normal and pre-dated the wedding. Indeed, pre-marital indications 
are vital in order that the severity of the illness can be determined at the time 
of the wedding. If the personality defect is to be shown to have impinged on 
the act of consent, it must therefore be shown to have existed at the time consent 
was given, as distinct from something which developed subsequently. This will 
be clear from the continuity of a behaviour pattern from prior to the marriage. 
Although one's capacity for marriage is not put t� the test until after the parties 
have begun to cohabit, deductions can be legimtimately made about pre­
marriage behaviour in the context of what is known about the married life. 
One who has been proved to have been incapable of the obligations of marriage 
will, most likely, have also been incapable of other relationships and other 
responsibilities. 
18. Also to be considered are possible causes of the behaviour other than
a severely disturbed personality, e.g. illness after marriage, extraneous factors 
such as inadequate accomodation or third party interference - anything which 
might have prevented the person from putting his / her capacity to the test. 
"Quibus principiis attentis, perpendi potest, utrum res peractae a 
coniugibus post matrimonium demonstrent vitia gravia psychologica 
antenuptialia, quibus iidem prohibeantur onera coniugalia adimplere, an potius 
mera� violationes onerum susceptorum, responsabiliter, seu scienter et volenter, 
positas. Non autem licet pravas violationes onerum coniugalium, ab iisdem 
patratas, semper tribuere vitiis psychosexualibus vel psychologicis et denegare 
eorumdem responsabilitatem. lta non omnes mulieres adulterae, quae etiam 
pluers amasios habuerunt, sunt nymphomanes. Neque adulteria, perdurante 
vita coniugali, patrata, semper demonstrant grava vitia psychologica, quae 
auferant responsabilitatem ac possibilitatem adimplendi onera suscepta. 
Humana cnim fragilitas ad obligationes matrimoniales assumptas scienter et 
volcnter non servandas saepc inducit, cum voluntas susceptis bonis consiliis 
ac propositis constanter non haereat. Quod magis tenendum est, si qui 
incapacitate psychologica adimplendi onera coniugalia affecti dicuntur, nullo 
vitio corporis et nervorum laborant'' 32•
The efforts made by the parties to create a good marriage and resolve 
difficulties are not irrelevant. It is always difficult to discern genuine incapacity 
if there is no evidence of effort, however misdirected those efforts might have 
been. It is true that some marriages fail due to a lack of effort, but this would 
not reflect in any way an '' inability to fulfil''. There are disordered personalities 
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who find it difficult to adjust to a marital relationship, but who, by patience 
and counselling, manage to overcome their difficulties and perhaps even to 
.come to terms with incompatibility of temperament. In such cases the degree 
of severity of the disorder is not incapacitating. The fact that a partner proves 
to be a difficult person for the other partner to live· with is not indicative that 
the former is incapable of marriage - in the correct judicial sense. When Courts 
are confronted with cases where there is reasonable doubt as to whether the 
line between difficulty and impossibility has been crossed, in such cases the 
decision must according to law, be in favour of the upholding of the validity 
of marriage 33.
19. In assessing the degree of severity of a psychic disorder the opinions
of psychiatric and / or psychological experts are always valuable and often 
indispensable in the interpretation of the facts presented by the non-professional 
witnesses. '' Attendendo ... est ad conclusiones peritorum dummodo eaedem 
sint suffultae solidis argumentis ex aegroti exploratione et ex actorum 
consideratione collectis" 34. "Iudicis erit investigare utrum periti in 
constabiliendo morbo recte in factis certis, institerint, testimoniorum veritati 
adhaeserint, rerum adiuncta matrimonium antecedentia, coricomhantia ac 
consequentia consideraverint, omnia nempe congesserint atque aestimaverint 
ad sententiam adstruendam, an vero praeiudicatis opinionibus indulserint" 35
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